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APPELLANT'S HEPL Y BRIEF 
TO RESPONDENTS' CROSS APPEAL 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS vVITH RELATION 
TO RULING OF THE LU\YER COURT ON 
APPELLANTS' _MOTION FOR NE"r TRIAL. 
Respondents' cross appeal in this action upon the 
question of the lower court, reducing the attorney's fee 
from $750.00 to $500.00 and contends the court erred 
in reducing the attorne~r's fee awar1led by the jury. 
1 
Upon the entry of the judgment on the verdict 
in this matter by the court, the Appellants filed a motion 
with the court to have verdict and judgment set aside 
and to have judgment entered in accordance with de-
fendants' motion for directed verdict and motion for 
new trial ( R. 71 ) . 
U pan the hearing of this motion the court informed 
the Attorney for Respondent that unless he consented 
to a reduction of the Attorney's fee from $750.00, as 
found by the jury, which the Appellants contend was 
improperly submitted to the jury, the court would 
grant Appellants' motion for a new trial, and in accord-
ance therewith the attorney for Respondents consented 
to the reduction, rather than have a new trial granted. 
From the order of the court, (R-87) Respondents' 
cross appeal, and in response to Respondents' Cross 
Appeal, Appellants submit the following: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REDUC-
ING THE ATTORNEY'S FEE A 'VARDED BY 
THE JURY. THE COURT DID, ERR, HO,V-
EVER, IN SUBMITTING TO THE JURY IN-
STRUCTION 9-D AND PROPOSITION NO. 3 
IN ITS SPECIAL VERDICT. 
As quoted in Respondents' brief, we quote again 
in support of Appellants' contention: 
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Tille :J8-l-18 UCA 1953: 
''ln action brought to enforce any lien under 
this chapter the successful parties shall be en-
titled lo recover a reasonable attorney's fee, to 
be fi,rcd by the court, which shall be taxed as 
cosb. in this action." (Emphasis supplied). 
In the first place it is the contention of Appellants 
that the court should ne,·er have submitted the question 
0f attorneys fees to the jury in view of the language 
of the foregoing quoted Section 38-1-18 UCA 1953. 
If the court allowed any attorney's fee at all, it should 
have been fixed by the court and not the jury. After 
the verdict of the jury, we are inclined to believe the 
court realized this and pursuant thereto did fix the 
attorney's fee, in granting the Appellants' motion for 
a new trial unless Respondents' attorney did reduce 
the fee fixed by the jury in the sum of $750.00 to that 
of $500.00 (R-87). 
We agree with Respondents' attorney as contended 
for in his Lrief in paragraph two at page 25, that 
"what was a reasonable fee in 19.30 may not be reason-
able in 1966 due to the reduced buying power of the 
dollar." 
Under Seetion 5:2-1-18 UCA 19~3 the statute pro-
vided that the successful party shall be entitled to re-
cover a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the 
court, not to exceed $25. U po11 the amendment of this 
statute wherein the legislature provided for a reasonable 
attorney's fee without fixing the amount we are inclined 
to Lelieve that the~· did not intend to have the court 
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fix an attorney's fee out of proportion to the value of 
the dollar due to inflationary prices in 1966. Inflation 
has not reduced the value of the dollar to the extent 
which Respondents' attorney 'vould contend for in 
proportion to the sum of $25.00, as provided by 
Section 52-1-18, UCA 1943, to that of $500.00 now 
fixed by the court. If the contention of Respondents' 
attorney is correct that the Appellate Court has a right 
to fix attorney's fees in such cases, which Appellants 
contend is not correct, it is the contention of the Ap-
lants that this fee of $500.00 should be reduced accord-
ingly. 
POINT II 
IT IS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE 
TRlAL COURT TO FIX A REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY'S FEE, IF ONE IS ALLOWED 
AND NOT THE SUPREME COURT. 
The most recent case on this point is Brimwood 
Homes, Inc. vs. Knudsen Builders Supply Co., U 
Utah 2nd 419, 385 P2d 982, 1963, wherein the Utah 
Court stated at page 984: 
."The defendant being the successful party is 
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee to be as-
sessed by the lower court." 
.More in point are the VV ashington cases of Elmore 
v. Graystone of Centralia, Inc., 387 P2nd 75, (Wash. 
1963), and Gannon v. Emtman, 40.5 P. 2nd 2.54, ("\\Tash. 
1965). 
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In the Elmore case at page 76 the court makes the 
following conclusion: 
"The judgment is affirmed, but the cause is 
remanded to the trial court to consider def end-
ant's motion for an award of Attorney's fees on 
appeal." 
In the Gannon case at page 257 the court cites the 
Elmore decision for the following proposition: 
"Respondent will be awarded his costs on ap-
peal, and the cause will be remanded to the trial 
court to consider respondent's motion for an 
award of attorney's fees on appeal." 
It is the contention of Appellants that these cases 
support the proposition that it is improper for the 
Supreme Court to make an award of Attorney's fees 
without remanding the case to the trial court for its 
consideration. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING 
THE JURY THAT AV ALID LIEN EXISTED 
AGAINST THE PROPERTY OF DEFEND-
ANTS, D. A. SKEEN AND BERTHA K. 
SKEEN, AND ALSO ERRED IN DIRECTING 
A VERDICT AGAINST D. A. SKEEN AND 
BERTHA K. SKEEN. 
Plaintiffs' attorney is not entitled to attorney's 
fee for his services in this case, since it is not properly 
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an action brought to enforce a lien as contemplated 
by the Utah Code pertaining tu mechanic's liens. 
As set forth in Appellants' Point 1 aud Point 2 
in its main brief, this action is not properly withiu tiie 
:Mechanic's lien statute and therefore attorney's fees 
cannot be awarded. \Vithout reiterating the argumenb 
set forth in said Points 1 and 2, we respectfully refer 
thereto in support of this proposition. 
Attorney's fees were fixed by the trial court in 
accordance with Section 38-1-18 UCA 1953, if such an 
attorney's fee were allowable, and the lower court did 
not err in exercising its discretion in reducing the 
amount improperly set by the jury. 
Section 38-1-18 UCA 1953, gives the trial court 
exclusive power to set fees, if the case is properly an 
action to enforce lien rights. 
Plaintiffs' attorney has not cited a single case under 
Utah law where an increase in attorney's fee is cited 
as being proper. That is because the Utah court has 
always considered the question within the discretion of 
the trial court in a proper case. 
· CONCLUSION 
As contended for by Appellants, the court erred 
in directing a verdict against the defendants D. A. 
Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen, that the property in ques-
tion, and under the facts, ,.,-as property subject to a 
lien, and if said property was not subject to a lien 
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in favor of the Respondents, then there was no attor-
ney's fees to be allowed, which, of course, is self evident. 
If the court so holds that the property in question 
was subject to a lien in favor of Respondents, then it 
was the prerogative of the lower court to fix such a 
reasonable attorney's fee, and not the Supreme Court 
on appeal, as outlined in the cases cited in this reply 
brief of the Appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Benjamin Spence 
Attorney for Appellants 
1401 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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